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Operationalizing and Measuring Competition: Determinants of Competition in 
Private Banking Industry in India 
Abstract 
 
Using an appropriate theoretical framework and econometric methodology, the study 
has sought to measure and model competition in private banking industry in India in 
an attempt to analyse the process of market dynamics in the industry. The changing 
scenario of private banking consequent to deregulation provided the motivation 
behind the study. It used the concept of competition proposed by Stigler (1961) and 
measured it by Bodenhorn’s (1990) measure of mobility. The study provides a 
critique of the mechanism of inducing competition, which is implicit in the 
Narasimham Committee (1991). It then provides the theoretical background of an 
alternative mechanism based on Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm, which 
incorporates basic conditions and strategic groups, apart from including entry, 
economies of scale, product differentiation and price cost margin, One basic 
contention of the study is that competition goes beyond “conduct” and encompasses 
all the four components of S-C-P paradigm: basic conditions, structure, conduct and 
performance. 
Accordingly, a three equation simultaneous equation model is used to ultimately 
estimate the equation of competition through Tobit technique. The result demonstrates 
that variables related to basic conditions, structure, and conduct and performance 
influence competition. The study has found evidence against the simplistic 
relationship between concentration and competition, which remained implicit in the 
literature. The study also developed a methodology to arrive at market form from an 
analysis of three aspects of a market and concludes that private banking industry in 
India is characterized by monopolistic competition. 
Keywords: Competition, Structure-Conduct-Performance, Banking reform. 
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Operationalizing and Measuring Competition: Determinants of 
Competition in Private Banking Industry in India 
I.0 Introduction 
Growth can be financed by government investment through fiscal policy or by private 
investment through monetary policy. While a State-led strategy relies on fiscal 
development finance a market-led one would rely on banks.   Ideally speaking, there 
should be competition between these two strategies. Apparently, there is not much 
possibility of competition between institutions providing funds for public investment.  
The State and banks are therefore, are in this sense competing entities. While a State-
led strategy relies on fiscal development finance a market-led one would rely on 
banks.  However, competition can exist between different banks which provide funds 
for private investment. The study attempts to contribute in the direction of providing a 
framework and methodology for analyzing competition in banking industry.  
It is necessary to go into the history of banking for understanding the changing role of 
fiscal and monetary policy. The failure of the private banking industry in the pre-
nationalization era had led to nationalization. The main reasons were: 
1. Industrial policy – concentration of economic power.  
2. Undermining the strategic developmental interests – priority sector lending. 
3. Siphoning-off funds into own businesses.  
All of the above was anti-developmental. Firstly, this mistrust led to the need for 
regulation of banking industry. Post-nationalization banking industry became 
regulated. The role of the banking industry and its potential for financing growth 
became controlled and restricted. Secondly, on account of losses of public sector 
 4 
banks the burden on fiscal funding increased. There was a constant need for re-
capitalization. Over a period from 1985-86 to 2000-02, the government has 
contributed Rs 20,046 crores towards recapitalization of public sector banks
1
. Since 
banks were not doing so well, and their growth was controlled, the burden of 
financing growth shifted onto fiscal policy. Monetary policy had to become more 
restrictive. This points to the changing role of fiscal and monetary policy in financing 
growth. 
Hence, in terms of strategy, there was a choice between stifling the banking industry 
to meet long term developmental goals and freeing the banking industry so as to allow 
private initiative and finance to facilitate growth and development. In the process it is 
expected that a more competitive banking industry would lead to a more efficient 
financing of growth. 
The recent financial sector reform, especially, the Narasimham Committee 
initiative resolves this dilemma. It frees banking industry in terms of allowing entry 
which has led to growth of private banking industry. Parallely, the deregulation of 
interest rates provides the conditions for private banks to manage themselves more 
efficiently. With the removal of restrictions, it is expected that banking industry 
would become more competitive 
Clearly, operations of both public sector banks and foreign banks
2
 are relatively more 
restricted in the deregulatory phase of the banking industry. Hence, we have chosen to 
concentrate on (domestic) private banking alone for studying competition. Although 
private banking is not the major component of the banking sector, its importance is 
                                                 
1 Mathur, K.B.L.(2002) 
2 Deb, A.T. (2006) 
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progressively increasing
3
. Today it would be no exaggeration to treat this segment of 
banking industry as the most dynamic segment. It no longer plays a residual role in 
the banking industry.  Of the three components, private banks operate in the most 
open environment. Therefore, they are likely to be closest to competitive markets. It is 
also the segment that has seen the greatest growth and entry of new banks making it 
prone to competition. 
Our interest is in studying the new liberalised (de-regulated) environment for 
banking and for this purpose. The question is why it is important to study competition.  
Firstly, there is not adequate discussion about private sector banks in the Narasimham 
Committee report, even when they have been visualised as dynamic agents, which 
would improve the functioning of the banking industry through competition. 
Secondly, there is hardly a study of competition in Indian industry, let alone one in 
Indian banking industry
4
. Finally, the need to study competition in banking industry 
has been stressed in the literature
5
. This study chooses to use the Structure-Conduct-
Performance (S-C-P) approach to analyse competition in private banking industry in 
India.  
Plan of the paper:  Section II is devoted to the review of literature.  Section III relates 
to conceptual issues. The hypotheses are given in Section IV. The measure of 
competition used is discussed in Section V. Section VI has the preliminary analysis of 
data. Section VII is about methodology. The determinants of competition are given in 
Section VIII. Section IX contains results. The concluding section is Section X. 
                                                 
3 Deb, A.T. (2006) 
4
 To our knowledge there is only one such study. Ghosh, Saibal and Prasad, A. (2005), Competition in 
Indian Banking, IMF Working Paper, July, paper 05/141. 
5 
Santomero (1984) stressed the importance of studying the degree of competitiveness in the financial 
market that surround the banking firm.  
 6 
II.0 REVIEW OF LITERATURE
6
 
Theory purports limited price competition in a situation when a market is 
characterised by a high degree of concentration and a small number of firms. 
Moreover, the possibility of collusion arises with a reduction in the number of firms. 
Such a situation should result in conduct that causes relatively little mobility and 
turnover among the dominant firms. Shepherd observed that successful cooperation 
would - while it lasts-usually holds firm shares virtually constant. Such constancy 
may be used to infer cooperation, even when direct evidence is lacking. Constancy 
may also result from vigorous but stalemated competition, in a situation, where all 
firms succeed equally. But such a running stand off is relatively improbable. The 
greater the stability, the higher is the probability that overt or covert cooperation exits.  
If on the other hand, the market is characterised by low concentration and large 
number of firms, competition is more likely to be relatively intense for two reasons. 
First, presence of larger of number of firms makes the possibility of collusion remote. 
Second, presence of large number of firms makes it difficult to obtain information 
necessary to assess the action and possible counter action of rivals. Such uncertain 
environment is likely to lead to relatively intense competition for fear of 
outmanoeuvred by the rivals. When intense rivalry prevails in a market, the element 
of chance will result in some big winners and some big losers. It is apparent that a 
competitive market structure should force a kind of conduct or rivalry among firms 
that would be reflected in a relatively large amount of mobility and turnover.  
                                                 
6 For a detailed discussion on a theoretical notion of competition see: Bhanumurthy, K.V. and A.T. 
Deb (2007) ‘Theoretical Framework of Competition as Applied to Banking Industry’, Working Paper, 
www.papers.ssrn.com. 
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There have been two types of attempts to quantify the phenomenon of 
competitive rivalry. They focus on different phenomenon in an attempt to understand 
competition in a market. They relied on changes in the firm’s rank or the changes in 
their respective market shares. In their attempts to develop suitable indicators of 
competitive conduct, Heggestad and Rhoades (1976), Rhoades (1980), Rhoades and 
Rutz (1981) and Bodenhorn (1990) argue in favour of the former while Hymer and 
Pashigian (1962) argue in favour of the later
7
.  
In terms of the traditional industrial organization paradigm of S-C-P, extant 
studies like, Joskow (1960) argue that firm rank stability measures like mobility and 
turnover are complementary to measures of concentration as indicators of structure. 
Heggestad and Rhoades (1976) argued that mobility and turnover aspects are not 
elements of industry structure but rather reflect conduct. While mobility was defined 
as churning in rank position of the leading firms, the measure of turnover was defined 
as the number of firms below the leading group that  replace   the firms belonging to 
the leading group. Bodenhorn (1990) pointed out the problems with both measures.  
He argued that Heggestad and Rhoades’s measure of mobility takes a value zero, if 
two firms in the leading group change positions, while others maintain their positions. 
The problem with turnover measure is that it will take value 1, whether moves from 
rank 6 to rank 5 or from rank 16 to rank 5. These problems led Bodenhorn to 
construct his own measure as a sum of rank changes among the top firms.  It is 
important to observe that while Bodenhorn calls his measure mobility, it captures both 
the aspects of change in rank in the leading firms as well as entry of firms below the 
leading group into the leading group. It thus captures both the aspects of mobility and 
turnover, but is termed as “mobility” alone instead of mobility and turnover. Like 
                                                 
7 Further discussion can be had from Deb, A.T. (2004) 
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Denizer (1997) our study uses Bodenhorn’s measure. We calculated Bodenhorn 
measure in table VII.2 and following him called it mobility but the discussion based on 
the measure refers to both mobility and turnover.  
As distinct from the above studies, which attempted to empiricize competition 
rigorously, there are two groups of studies. The first group consist of a few theoretical 
works on the relationship between entry, number of firms and competition. They 
include, Shubik (1990) and Fama and Laffer (1962). The other group consist of few 
empirical studies, which come somewhat close to the questions examined by the 
present study. They include Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), which suggests that 
competitive conduct changes quickly as the number of incumbents increase. Another 
study due to Bikker and Half (2002) provided support for the conventional view that 
concentration impairs competitiveness.  A number of studies apply S-C-P hypothesis 
particularly in the context of banking industry. Gilbert (1984) provides a detailed 
survey of such studies. These studies attempt to test the hypothesis that degree of 
concentration influences the degree of competition. They estimate measures of bank 
performance as functions of concentration of deposits among banks in local market 
areas. The measures of performance used as indicators of the degree of competition 
among banks include bank profit rates, interest rates charged on loans and paid on 
deposits. However, results of the bank market structure do not consistently support or 
reject the hypothesis that market concentration influences bank performance. 
III.0 CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
Concentration is taken to be a summary measure of the market structure. In 
fact, it is often taken to be a summary measure of the market form as a whole (which 
 9 
consist of S-C-P). For instance, often tight and loose oligopoly
8
 has been defined in 
terms of concentration ratio. In fact, it is degree of competition, which defines the 
nature of market form and not the degree of concentration
9
. The impact of 
concentration on competition works through a number of factors that affect 
competition, consisting of S-C-P factors and basic conditions. Concentration exerts 
only a partial effect
10
. Therefore, the relationship between entry and market form is 
not determinate as well.  The notion of competition in Narasimham committee makes 
it appear as though entry is sufficient for generating competition. Deb (2004) pointed 
out that such an argument consists of the followings steps, which are worth 
examining. 
• Entry will reduce concentration. 
• Reduction in Concentration will   reduce monopoly power11.  
• Reduction in monopoly power is synonymous with rise in competition. 
(Nickell, 1996) 
Impact of entry on concentration has received some attention in the literature 
on industrial economics. Bodenhorn (1990), Denizer (1997) and Davies and Lyons 
(1991) argued that entry might as well increase concentration ratio. Deb (2004) to use 
some algebra to specify the precise conditions in which entry would have positive and 
negative impact on concentration. Clearly then, entry does not always reduce 
concentration. As for the second part of the argument, assumptions have been already 
                                                 
8
 A tight oligopoly is defined in terms of four-firm concentration ratio of above 60%, and a loose 
oligopoly in terms of below 40% four-firm concentration ratio. 
9 For a detailed discussion see: Deb, A.T. (2004). 
10
 Such argument is fallaciously used by Shiraj and Rajsehkaran (2001). It states that with falling 
concentration, competition rises. 
11
  Monopoly power is the ability to alter prices away from competitive levels to earn economic profit 
for long periods, without attracting new competitors and without improving their product or 
reducing their production cost (Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green, 1995). 
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worked out by Saving (1970) under which there will be a systematic relationship 
between concentration ratio and monopoly power. Using the above contentions, Deb 
(2004) concluded that there exists no general relationship between entry and 
concentration, or between concentration ratio and monopoly power.  
The notion of entry and competition in S-C-P paradigm is associated with the 
following problems. Traditional theory discuses the concept of entry barrier, which 
gives an advantage to the existing, firms.  In terms of the S-C-P paradigm, 
competition has been classified as a conduct variable (Bodenhorn, 1990). Secondly, 
the traditional S-C-P does not take account of the influence of basic conditions, 
conduct and performance on competition. Thirdly, the underlying construct in S-C-P 
paradigm to understand competition is price cost margin. 
A framework to study such a notion of competition is developed in the 
following sections. It assimilates traditional elements of S-C-P paradigm including 
entry, economies of scale, product differentiation and price cost margin as well as 
other elements including basic conditions and strategic groups.  
IV.0 AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO ANALYSE COMPETITION 
 In the light of the above discussion, we are developing an analytical 
framework to understand competition. Such a framework includes the following 
elements. Firstly, it is believed that competition is an overall state that describes the 
nature of the market form.  Hence, it encompasses all the aspects of an industry, 
namely basic conditions, structure, conduct and performance. Secondly, there is a 
phenomenon of entry facilitators as opposed to entry barriers. The basic approach to 
entry barrier does not look at basic conditions. Hence the conclusion that returns to 
scale constitutes a barrier to entry. Assuming that long run costs are a product of both 
 11 
internal and external economies of scale, it still does not take into account basic 
conditions.  Our understanding in this context is different from the traditional theory. 
Once basic conditions like technology are not treated as a parameter but are allowed 
to change, then it may be seen how it may act as an entry facilitator. It will lead to 
situation in which long run average cost of new firms will lie at a lower level than the 
old firms, which initially enjoyed a cost advantage over the new firms. Entry 
facilitators, along with the concept of strategic group, basic conditions and different 
elements of market structure are put together in Figure 2, which along with Figure 1 
to provide an analytical framework to analyse competition. The figures attempt to 
synthesise the approaches of S-C-P and strategic groups. While, it includes traditional 
elements of S-C-P paradigm including entry, economies of scale, product 
differentiation and price cost margin, it also incorporates basic conditions and 
strategic groups to analyse the process of market dynamics in the industry. In the 
traditional S-C-P paradigm, it is structure, which influences entry. However, it has 
been observed that in case of banking, change in basic condition directly influences  
Figure 1: Nature of Competition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Basic conditions 
Structure 
Conduct 
Performance 
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Figure 2: Entry and Market Dynamics 
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LEGEND 
LACn = Long Run Average Cost of New Bank      Qmax = Maximum size       
ACn = Average Cost of New Bank                     Qo = Output of Old Bank   
ACo = Average Cost of Old Bank 
Lp = Long Run Price 
LACo = Long Run Average Cost of New Bank 
Qn = Output of new Bank    
conduct by bypassing structure. In the Figure 2, output and average cost are 
represented on the x and y-axes respectively. Let the discussion begin with the status 
of old banks on the eve of entry of new banks. They did not start with the provision of 
having to have an optimal scale in the beginning itself. In the absence of   new banks, 
they got the benefit of serving a whole market and in the process, lowered cost 
through exploitation of economies of scale.  
The entry barrier argument can well be granted in terms of internal economies 
arising in favour of old firms. These would arise out of indivisibilities and experience. 
However, internal economies are only likely to enhance the advantage the old banks 
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may be experiencing, in addition to economies that they derive from external 
economies. External economies arises essentially an expansion of the industry. 
In long run industry equilibrium, only efficient firms remained because they 
have achieved the optimal scale. In the regulated period, the old banks reached 
economies of scale when they were perhaps producing QMax   level of output. Now 
the issue is how the new banks could enter and overtake the old banks, when the latter 
were enjoying the benefits of economies of scale.  
 To explain the scenario after entry with new banks with a better technology, 
two average cost curves are shown, one above the other. The upper curve represents 
average cost of the old banks and the lower one shows the cost situation of the new 
firms. This is because the new banks entered with a better technology, which resulted 
in lower cost of production. Clearly the new banks enjoyed a potential absolute cost 
advantage because the new banks at a lower cost can produce the same output. 
However, initially the new banks suffered from a relative cost advantage because of a 
lower volume of   production in the initial period.  
After entry of new banks, expansion of the industry benefited the old banks in 
the initial phase. It was natural for people to go to an established bank as opposed to a 
new bank, which was yet to establish its credibility. Substitution of an old bank with a 
new bank took place over time, when the new banks were perceived as provider of 
better services with the help of new technology. However, there was a caveat here. 
The amount of money needed to open an account with new banks is substantially 
higher than that of an old bank. Such difference in strategic behaviour limited the 
scope of substitution of old banks by the new banks. Thus, it is clear that, the new 
firms are not likely to have economies of scale during the period immediately after 
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their entry. However, there was a latent demand for a variety of   technology-based 
services emanating from affluent section of the population. In absence of supply of 
such services, such a section more readily joined the new banks.  This caused an 
expansion of industry in favour of new banks arising out of new technology thus 
while, technology and new services enabled differential advantage in favour of new 
banks, and such advantages however would unfold only over a period of time. 
It was imperative for the new banks to expand production in order to realize 
the benefits of economies of scale. Their strategy was to target the well off segment of 
the population through provision of technology based services.  With this end in view, 
they engaged in product differentiation and developed brand names and ultimately 
went in for merger. In such a situation, the only alternative for the old firms was to go 
for new technology, which also had its own compulsions. Use of new technology is 
meaningful only when their economy of scale is exploited. With recession affecting 
their clients, second rung corporates located in their traditional area of operations, 
they had no choice but to look for expanded markets in metros.  It follows from the 
above discussion that market dynamics is shaped by three factors. 
1. Entry of new banks consequent on deregulation, motivated by expectations of 
profits through use of new technology and strategic conduct. 
2. The mechanism through which new banks could actually circumvent the 
advantages of old banks included new technology and strategic conduct.  
3.  Means adopted by the old banks to cope up with the new banks in the new 
scenario. 
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V.0 HYPOTHESES 
The following hypotheses are tested in this paper. 
• Entry is not only factor influencing competition 
• Entry has an indirect impact on competition. 
• Competition is influenced by basic conditions, structure, conduct and   
performance. 
• Rivalry is central to notion of competition. 
• Deregulation  has led to competition. 
VI.0 MEASURE OF COMPETITION USED IN THE STUDY.  
The way to understand competition is look at the range of market forms, 
which at one end is characterised by monopoly, and at the other end by perfect 
competition. Monopoly signifies absence of competition, while perfect competition 
signifies extreme form of competition. Competition under perfect competition appears 
to be random in nature, making it difficult to measure.  On the other hand, if rivalry 
were entirely deterministic, no method or modelling of competition would work.  Our 
concept of competition rests on evolving a notion that can be operationalised and 
measured. Therefore the conceptualisation essentially relates to intermediate market 
forms, which are at neither extreme. The requirement therefore is to develop a 
measure of competition that can incorporate the features of market forms that exist at 
the two ends of intermediate range. In oligopolistic market forms, both tendencies of 
rivalry as well as collusion are found. On the other hand, at the higher end of the 
competitive market forms, such as monopolistic competition, there is no collusion.  
Hence the measure of competition should have a higher value if competition is greater 
and a lower value if collusion is greater. In this sense, we must have a measure of 
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competition that is capable of reflecting this change from the lower end up to the 
higher end. Therefore, we use the following measure as an index of the degree of 
competition: 
Bodenhorn's Measure of Mobility = ∑
=
−−
5
1
|)1()(|
i
tRitRi   
Ri (t) = Rank of ‘i
 th
’ firm in t
th
 year. Leading firms are restricted to 5. 
It is the absolute difference in ranks of leading (5-firm) between two time periods. 
The earlier studies tended to equate competition to rivalry and measured 
competition as such. It appears that their interest was only in studying competitive 
market forms to the exclusion of oligopolistic market forms. Apparently, most of the 
studies on oligopoly focus on conduct, especially pricing decisions. In the present 
framework, competition is being studied as characteristics of the entire market form 
and not just conduct. Secondly, the measure of competition has to be such that it 
incorporates both the effect of collusion as well as rivalry. Furthermore, it has to 
encompass a range of pragmatic market forms. It is from this point of view that we 
shall now be examining our measure of competition. 
It may be argued that the degree of mobility and turnover is a consequence of 
rivalry and collusion. If mobility and turnover is high, then there is more of 
competition and less of collusion and if it is low, then there is more collusion and less 
of competition. This interpretation of competition, the extent to which it represents the 
resultant of both rivalry and collusion on is a contribution of the study. The earlier 
studies using mobility and turnover interpret the variable to be an indicator of rivalry 
alone. 
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Geroski (1990) rightly pointed out that the degree of rivalry in a market is 
difficult to determine with any precision, and probably cannot be completely captured 
by just one variable. There had been attempts in the literature to treat concentration 
and number as indicators of competition the literature. In our case, competition is not 
captured by one variable, it is sum total of two variables, each capturing different 
aspects of competition. Moreover, the interpretation being given to our measure of 
competition is that it incorporates both the effects namely, collusion and rivalry.  And 
thirdly, competition is being measured in a causal framework by a complex set of 
determinants in a system of three equations. 
Our measure of competition should be sensitive in both directions. If competition 
is taking place, it should be reflected in the measure and if competition is absent, it should 
not be reflected in the measure. What will be analyzed below is how our measure of 
competition remains valid in a set of diverse situations. In other words, the point is what 
is the code of our measure of competition in different situations and does it faithfully 
represent the phenomenon of competition in direction and magnitude. A number of 
proposals are cited below for this purpose. They relate to different situations of rivalry, 
collusion, and lastly expansion of market. There are different scenarios of market 
dynamics. While some are able influence a measure of competition some are not. 
Proposal 1: Entry in near perfectly competitive market does not produce a change in 
degree of competition.  
If the market form is near to perfect competition, then all firms are small firms 
and changes in their market share would lead to some market dynamics.  But it would 
not radically alter the ranking of top firms.  Therefore neither would concentration 
 18 
ratio would change, nor would ranking be altered significantly. Hence this kind of 
market dynamics is almost random.  It lacks direction.  
Proposal II: Random rivalry amongst small firms, in the presence of few large firms   
does not increase the degree of competition.  
If a few firms dominate the market, the presence of large number of small 
firms at the bottom is not likely to introduce any significant rivalry and competition. 
In such a case, random movements in share of small firms take place resulting in no 
change in rank of large firms. Thus there is no change in mobility and hence in 
competition. It may be indicative of a mixed market structure where large firms at the 
top coexist with a number of small firms at the bottom. 
Proposal III Non random rivalry amongst small firms increases the degree of 
competition. 
If rivalry amongst small firms is not random, then one or more small firms 
may cut into the share of other small firms. This may lead to displacement of   firms 
at the lower echelon of the array of top firms. This creates turnover and the degree of 
competition increases. 
Proposal IV: Rivalry between large firms will lead to increase in the degree of 
competition. 
Rivalry between large firms will be manifested in terms of change in their 
share, resulting in change in their ranks. This leads to mobility and the degree of 
competition increases. 
Proposal V: Collusion between small banks is not likely to increase the degree  
of competition. 
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Collusion leads to retention of market shares but it concerns small firms, it is not 
likely to affect the ranks of top firms, and hence degree of competition does not change. 
Proposal VI: Collusion between small and large banks is unlikely to affect the degree 
of competition. 
A large firm is unaffected by a small firm. It cannot retain its share by colluding 
with a small firm. Collusion   between them is unlikely to affect the market and the 
degree of competition. Thus collusion between a large and small firm is unlikely. 
Proposal VII: Collusion among large firms does not increase the degree of 
competition. 
Collusion among large firms leads to preservation of their market shares.  
There is no change in their market shares and rank remains unchanged. Thus mobility 
does not change and degree of competition will not increase. 
Proposal IX: Market expansion is neither a necessary nor a sufficient   condition for 
increasing the degree of competition. 
There is a popular notion that after a market expands, it becomes competitive.  
This is not necessarily true. The market may expand, but the same set of firms may 
continue to dominate the market with unchanged ranks. Nor it does not imply that any 
firm from below affects the top ranks.  Thus even when market expands, the degree of 
competition may not increase.  
Our notion of competition is not based on passive entities and random 
happenings. In our view, competition has to manifest through the actions and 
identities of particular firms. Hence, any concept of competition has to be based on 
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behaviour and position of certain firms. Therefore we are aligning our understanding 
with mobility and turnover, which do not change accidentally.  
Our concept of competition is based on the following 
1. Rivalry is not expected from far below. Therefore in the event of such rivalry, 
it unleashes a greater competitive force. It is indicative of a higher degree of 
competitive force. 
2.  Rivalry is expected from amongst the top firms. But it is also the top firms, 
which can be lured to collusion. It will dampen the degree of competition. 
Hence while such an event is more likely, the change in the degree of 
competition signifies a lower weight.  
 Hence our measure is assigning appropriate weights to the appropriate events 
so as to reflect the right degree of competition. Our measure has to be such that it 
fulfills the following conditions, so that it may be said that the variable used to 
measure competition is following an appropriate code. Only when degree of 
competition increases, our measure of competition must increase in value. This is a 
necessary condition for the measure to be valid. If our measure of competition has 
increased, then it must be taken to mean that the degree of competition has increased. 
This is a sufficient condition for the validity of the measure. 
 
VII.0 A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF DATA  
Table 1 revealed that ranks of most of the old banks have deteriorated in the industry 
over time, while those of new banks have improved without a single exception. Only 
two old banks, one among the top and other among the bottom could retain their 
ranks. They are LKB and JKB. 
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Table 1 Ranks of old and new banks during 1995 and 2000. 
        
 Banks 1995 2002     
 VB 1 7     
 FB 2 5     
 JKB 3 3     
 BOR 4 15     
 SIB 5 10     
 UWB 6 12     
 KB 7 8     
 KVB 9 13     
 INDB 10 6     
 CSB 11 19     
 TMC 12 16     
 LVB 13 20     
 GTB 14 9     
 SB 15 26     
 BOB 16 22     
 DB 17 23     
 HDFC 18 2     
 CUB 19 21     
 UTI 20 4     
 NDB 21 25     
 ICICI 23 1     
 LKB 24 24     
 RB 26 27     
 NNB 27 29     
 CB 28 17     
 GBK 29 30     
 BOP 32 18     
        
Table 2 Bodenhorn's Measure of Mobility:1992-2002 
     
   measure of mobility   
 1993 2   
 1994 2   
 1995 0   
 1996 2   
 1997 6   
 1998 3   
 1999 11   
 2000 18   
 2001 5   
 2002 0   
     
A look at the Table 2 leads to an important observation. Entry of new banks has led to 
emergence of competitive forces reflected in increased mobility and turnover in the 
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industry.  One can observe a rise in strength of competitive forces following entry of 
new firms. Forces of competition reached their peak in 1999-2000. It was followed by 
a period of stability in ranks of leading firms
12
. The period from 2000-01 to 2001-02 
was characterized by   complete absence of mobility and turnover. It is apparent that a 
period of instability created by emergence of competitive forces has given way to 
stability. Thus one may distinguish between two phases of competition following 
entry in private banking industry. In the first phase, the strength of the force of 
competition increased to reach their peak. This is followed by a phase, in which 
competition became less intense and ultimately died down. The course of events 
related to generation of competitive forces following entry resembles the aftermath of 
throwing of a stone in a water body, as a result of which ripples are created, gather 
strength, and disappears. 
VIII.0 METHODOLOGY 
The following exercises have been conducted in order to understand the 
market dynamics/status of competition in the market.  
1.  Correlation coefficients of market shares between 1992 and 1994 as well as 
1995 and 2002 are computed and tested for their significance. The first set of 
correlation acts like a controlled variable. It captures the static picture in the 
absence of entry and is benchmarked as absence of competition. We postulate 
no significant change in market shares between 1992 and 1994 and expect 
them to be having a positive and significant correlation. But if there is a 
change in the situation, which is induced by entry, it will be reflected in terms 
                                                 
12
 Mobility in the pre entry phase was at a low level, and there was no turnover. It may be possible to 
argue that the entire change in mobility can be attributed to adverse impact of change in the rank of J 
and K Bank due to disturbances related to terrorism in J and K Apart from this change; there was no 
other change before 1995, in which entry took place. 
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of either change in the sign or reduction in the value of the correlation 
coefficient. One may visualize the following scenarios with regard to change 
in correlation coefficient from one period to another. 
• From positive significant to positive significant 
•  From significant positive to insignificant positive  
•  From significant positive to insignificant negative  
•  From significant positive to significant negative 
2. Market shares of banks in 1995 were correlated with their market shares in 
1996 and then with the same in succeeding years. The purpose of this exercise 
is to reveal the strength of association of market shares between two years, as 
the distance of them widens. On the other hand, correlation coefficients 
between market shares of banks in any two consecutive years are calculated, 
beginning from the year 1995. This along with earlier exercise will reveal 
some aspects of market dynamics in the period under study.  
3. A chi square test is done to test whether size distribution of the banks is   a log 
normal distribution. This is because calculation of mobility and turnover 
figures is meaningful only when the size distribution of firms resembles a log 
normal distribution.  
4. Measures of mobility and turnover over the pre entry and post entry periods 
are calculated and the significance of their difference is tested. This is done 
with a view to understand whether entry has instilled competitive forces.  
5. Karl Pearson and Spearman’s correlation coefficients between market shares 
of   banks at the top and the bottom are calculated to see how their market 
shares are changing, so as to analyse their implication.  
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6. The study uses two equations developed in the literature. One for explaining 
concentration and other one for explaining profitability. In the current paper, 
another equation is developed for explaining competition in the industry. This 
equation includes both concentration and profitability as its independent 
variables. Thus we are led into a system of simultaneous equations, consisting 
of three equations.  
Schmalensee (1989) has reviewed a number of econometric models related to 
S-C-P paradigm and argued that most of variables used in these models are 
endogenous to the system. They per se determine and are determined by other 
variables in the system. There are not many predetermined variables that one could 
find in the system. This creates serious econometric problems. Schmalensee argued 
that this endogeneity problem couldn’t be solved by more elaborate model 
specifications. Siddharthan and Pandit (1992) argued that this problem couldn’t be 
dismissed by the observation that least square and simultaneous equation methods 
yield similar estimates. Schmalensee reviewed a number of cross section studies and 
suggested that the primary objective of these studies should be to describe main 
pattern in the data set used in the study. He even goes as far as to say that one should 
go for descriptive statistics and not structural hypothesis testing.  
In our system of equations, the main structural equation, which determines 
competition, contains two endogenous variables, namely profit and market 
concentration.  In the method of Hayashi and Sims (1983), these endogenous 
variables are regressed on the explanatory variables upon which they depend so as to 
obtain the predicted values of these variables. Both market concentration and profit 
depend upon exogenous variables. Hence their predicted values are truly 
predetermined variables, which are endogenously determined. For instance, in the 
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case of concentration, the measure of size is based on asset and not market share. 
Similarly, the skewness relates to asset size and not market share. Even number is 
obviously exogenous. In the case of the main structural equation, ‘OFA’ relates to 
technology, which is part of basic conditions and hence exogenous to the system. The 
other variable of wages also clearly does not depend on any variables in the system. In 
the case of the profit equation, the variable that captures advertisement is expressed as 
proportion of expenditure and hence is not advertisement intensity as is measured for 
product differentiation. Once again liquidity and spread are independent variables not 
being determined by other variables in the system. Therefore the objections by 
Schmalensee do not appear to be valid for our system of equations. The only 
limitation may be that the estimators so obtained are ‘nearly efficient’. On the other 
hand, our methodology is an improvement over extant studies because of two reasons. 
One, the analysis is carried out for the entire population-private banking industry. 
Two, in our system of equations, competition is explained with the help of feedback 
of conduct, performance, structure as well as basic conditions. 
The equations for profitability and concentration were estimated with OLS 
techniques and the estimated value of concentration and profitability are plugged in 
the third equation. However, equation for competition   has to be estimated with a 
technique called Tobit regression, which uses maximum likelihood estimators. This is 
because the variable used in representing competition assumes the value zero on a few 
occasions.  
IX.0 DETERMINANTS OF COMPETITION 
 The study has sought to explain competition in terms of variables derived from 
our modified form of S-C-P paradigm and the basic theme of the paper, which 
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conceptualizes competition as an all encompassing variable involving all the four 
elements of the paradigm.  Each proposed determinant of competition is derived from 
different elements of S-C-P paradigm; basic condition, structure, conduct and 
performance. The variables are discussed as under.  
 The scenario with regard to technology used in banking industry underwent a 
drastic change, during the period of the study. A new technological paradigm
13
 came 
into being, which have brought forward new opportunities for development of new 
products and service. Other fixed asset, aggregated for the whole industry, is used as a 
proxy for capturing technology in the industry, which falls in the realm of basic 
conditions. New banks have internalized this basic condition in terms of a higher ratio 
of other fixed asset to number of conduct variable. On the other hand, this variable, 
other fixed asset aggregated at the level of the industry is used in the equation to 
examine the impact of basic conditions on competition. 
 The variable related to the market structure used in explaining competition is 
concentration. Next two variables used in the equation are related to strategic conduct. 
A significant result of the discriminant analysis pursued in the literature
14
 is that 
wages paid by new banks, as a proportion to their total operational expenditure is 
significantly lower than that of the old banks.  This strategic variable is used as an 
explanatory variable in the equation. A significant characteristic of post 1999 period 
of the study relates to merger, which also falls in the arena of strategic conduct. It is 
captured in the equation in the form of a dummy variable. It assumes the value one in 
the years in which merger has occurred in the industry and zero in other years. Lastly, 
                                                 
13
  A technological paradigm defines contextually the needs that are meant to be fulfilled, the scientific 
principles utilized for the task, the material technology to be used. (Dosi, 1988) 
14
 Deb, A. T. and K.V. Bhanumurthy (2005)  
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the ratio of profit to asset, a variable in the arena of   performance is included as a 
determinant of competition.   
However, there is no a priory theory to specify neither what form the variables 
is appropriate as determinants, nor what is the direction of their influence on 
competition in each case
15
. One is not sure whether it is the level variable or a 
variable that captures the dispersion in that variable is the relevant determinant. Both 
the absence of knowledge of the form in which a determinant influences competition 
and the direction of the influence render construction of a model to analyse 
competition a very difficult task. In absence of any hypothesis about the impact of 
most of the variables on competition, alternative hypothesis in case of these variables 
becomes two-tailed.  
X.0 RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
  Table 3   Correlation coefficient between market shares of banks. 
  (Please refer to summary below)       
             Correlation Coefficient      
             Karl Pearson's  Spearman's     
  1) 1992-1994                                         .96a          .97a     
  
 
2) 1995-2002             0.05         .53a     
  (i) to (vi)       
  1995-1996            .96a         .94a     
  1995-1997            .89a         .82a     
  1995-1998            .80a         .81a     
  1995-1999            .68a         .59a     
  1995-2000            .51a         .55a     
  1995-2001            .36         .52a     
  (vii) to (xiii)       
  1995-1996            .96a         .94a     
  1996-1997            .97a         .93a     
  1997-1998            .97a         .90a     
  1998-1999            .94a         .86a     
  1999-2000            .91a         .94a     
  2000-2001            .97a         .99a     
  2001-2002            .84a         .99a
16
     
                                                 
15
 This does not apply to concentration ratio, which is hypothesized to influence competition negatively 
in level form. 
16 'a' means significance at 1% level of significance.  
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Summary of Table 3 
Two types of correlations have been tested for their magnitude and level of 
significance. (With reference to the Table 3 above): 
1) This gives the Karl Pearson’s’ correlation co-efficient between the market shares 
in 1991-92, the initial year of the study and 1993-94 the terminal year of the pre-
entry period. It also gives the Spearman’s rank correlation also for the same 
period. 
2) This gives the Karl Pearson’s’ correlation co-efficient between the market shares 
in 1994-95, the initial year of entry and 2001-02 the terminal year of the study. It 
also gives the Spearman’s rank correlation also for the same period. 
(i) to (vi) This column gives six sets of Karl Pearson’s’ correlation between the 
market shares of firms in 1995 as base year and the respective current year. It also 
gives the Spearman’s rank correlation also for the same period. 
(vii) to (xiii) This column gives seven sets of Karl Pearson’s’ correlation between the 
market shares of firms in 1994-95 and the subsequent year 1995-96. It also gives the 
Spearman’s rank correlation also for the same period. 
Table 3 reports the correlation of market share of banks in different years as well as 
correlations between ranks. To begin with, let us focus on two pairs of years, 1992 
and 1994 on the one hand and 1995 and 2002 on the other. Three aspects of the two 
correlation coefficients need to be commented upon. They include magnitude, 
direction and significance.  
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• There occurred a reduction in the correlation coefficient in the post entry period 
and it ceased to be statistically significant. This reveals weakening of association 
between original and subsequent market share in the period following entry. 
• The rank correlation coefficient has remained statistically significant, even 
when the association between original and subsequent market shares 
weakened; there is no major churning of banks, both in the period preceding 
and succeeding entry. 
• There has been no change in sign of the correlation coefficients, which implies 
that no reversal in market share as well ranks of banks have taken place. 
Now correlation coefficients between two successive years are commented upon, 
starting with 1995 and 1996. Alongside, correlation coefficients of market shares of 
1996 onwards with market shares in 1995 also will be looked at. Table 3 provides the 
details, which reveals the following.  
Both the correlation coefficients between market shares in any two 
consecutive years remain positive, high and significant. This reveals that market 
shares and rank of firms in 1996 and onwards is closely associated with the 
succeeding year. There is no significant change in market shares and ranks of banks in 
the post entry period on a year-to-year basis.   
When market shares of banks in 1995 are related to the same in 1996 and then 
to subsequent years, it is observed that changes in correlation coefficients are 
consistently taking place in one direction. It has kept on reducing, which signifies a 
slow process of weakening of association between initial and subsequent market 
share, as the subsequent year becomes distant from the initial year. Ultimately, the 
correlation between 1995 and 2001, as well as between 1995 and 2002 has emerged 
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insignificant, showing absence of any association between initial and subsequent 
years.  The corresponding rank correlation coefficients have remained positive and 
insignificant, although its magnitude has consistently declined as ranks of   banks in 
increasingly distant years are correlated with in the same in the year 1995. It is clear 
that the trend in rank correlation coefficient follows a trend similar to ordinary 
correlation coefficient.  In response to some change in the market, market shares of 
banks is first to change followed by change in their ranks. 
The next exercise is an important statistical prelude to use of measures of 
mobility and turnover in the study. A chi square statistic given by Jacues-Berra 
showed that size distribution of the banks resembles a log normal distribution in all 
the years under study, except for the last year 2001-02. The period covered by the 
study is divided as before: pre 1995 and post 1995 and a’t- test' is used in test in 
average mobility in these two periods. The ‘t test’ is subject the assumption of 
unequal variances in the two underlying populations. The result is reported in Table 4. 
It shows a significant rise in average mobility in the post entry period. 
Table 4 Test of difference in means of  mobility of banks  
  during pre and post entry period.   
      
   Mobility Mobility   
   1992-1994 1994-2002   
 Mean 2 5.625   
 Variance 0 37.98214   
 No of observations 2 8   
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0    
 Degrees of freedom (n1+n2 -3) 7    
 t Stat        -1.66c     
      
Footnote: c. Implies that the t ratio is significant at 10% level of significance. 
      
      
Firstly, the market shares and ranks of all banks in 1992 are correlated with their 
market shares and ranks in 2002. Then five largest banks are chosen in 1992, and their 
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market shares and ranks are correlated with the same in 2002. The exercise is repeated 
for the firms that follow the five largest banks in 1992. Thus, six correlation 
coefficients are calculated, all of which turned out be significant. There occurred no 
significant change in the market share and ranks of   the banks belonging to lower 
segment in 1992 over the period 1992-2002. It is not able to exert any impact on the 
top firms in 1992, as both the correlation coefficients related to these banks remain 
significant. It is not likely to effect concentration as well as mobility and turnover. 
Whatever change is taking place in small firms, it does not affect the whole market. 
Heggestad and Rhoades (1976) pointed out that the rank changes among smaller firms 
are more likely attributable to chance. However, whether rank changes of smaller 
firms are random or not is the issue. The issue is significance of rank changes at the 
bottom for the whole market. If the rank changes of smaller firms are random, it may 
not be assumed away that their impact on the top firms and on the whole market is 
also random. The exercise reveals that effect of these changes at bottom is not likely 
to be significant for the whole market. It once again reinforces the idea that one ought 
to focus in the top segment of the industry in an attempt to analyse competition.  Thus 
use of measures of mobility and turnover is vindicated. 
 We have tried out different  forms of the variables along with different 
functional forms. The different forms of the variable used include its standard 
deviation, variance, skewness and kurtosis of the ratio. Amongst these, equations 
using the standard deviation and variance of the ratio performed the best and provided 
similar results. The complete model to analyse competition consists of the following 
three equations. 
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H=ß10+ß11 (SIZE) +ß12 (SKEW)
 2
 +ß13 (NUMBER)
 3
 +U1t 
П=ß20+ß21 (LQDR) +ß22 (ADEX) +ß23 (SPRD) + ß23 (DRDM) +U2t 
CMPT=ß30+ß31(EH) +ß32 (OFA) +ß33 (SW) +ß43 (EП) +ß53(MRDM) +U3t 
The abbreviations in equations are explained below. 
H= Herfindal’s concentration ratio. 
SIZE= Average asset of a bank 
SKEW=Skewness in distribution of assets among banks. 
NUMBER= Number of banks  
Profitability (П): profit to asset ratio. 
Liquidity ratio (LQDT): Liquid asset as a ratio of total asset 
Spread (SPRD): Difference between interest earned and expended deflated by asset 
Diversification (DVS): ratio of other income to total income. 
Advertising Expenditure (ADEX): ratio of expenditure on advertising to total 
operating expenditure. 
CMPT= Competition. 
EH= predicted values of Herfindal’s concentration ratio, derived from first equation. 
OFA= other fixed asset. 
SW= standard deviation of the ratio of wages to operational expenditure. 
EП=predicted values of profit to asset ratio, derived from second equation. 
MRDM= dummy for the years in which merger between banks occurred. 
 33 
The first two equations were estimated as follows
17
. 
H= 0.093 -0.00000002(SIZE) +0.003(SKEW) 
2 
-0.000001(NUMBER)
 3
, 
       (21.55)   (-3.17)                (10.04)                    (-8.01) 
Adjusted R square=.97 and F=99.43. 
П= -0.002-0.004(LQDT)-0.05(ADEX) +0.41(SPRD) + 0.006(DRDM),  
 (-0.37)  (-.49)          (-.55)                (4.59)               (5.05) 
Adjusted R square=0.82, F=10.44. 
The results of Tobit exercise in the current study are given below in Table 5. 
Table 5: Structural Equation for Competition -Results of Tobit Regression  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 The equation for concentration and profitability are developed by two different components of a 
broader study on private banking in India. The current paper is also a component of the said study. 
Please refer to Deb, Ashis Taru (2005), page 110, 201-2,205-8. 
            Asymptotic  
 Variable         Normalized               Standard          t ratio          Regression 
                                 Coefficient                 error                                  coefficient 
 EH                      -9115.4                2444.1             -3.7296         -1760.4      
 OFA                   -0.16548E-02      0.44344E-03    -3.7317        -0.31958E-03   
 SW                     -1070.3                291.15              -3.6762       -206.71       
 E P                         9250.1                2559.8               3.6136        1786.5        
 MRDM                167.51                44.879               3.7326        32.352        
 CONSTANT       823.99                220.91               3.7299        159.14 
 CMPT                 5.1779                1.3839               3.7417 
 
  
 Log-likelihood function= 1.5782253 
 Mean-square error = 0.29010048E-01 
 Mean error=-0.63159354E-14 
 Mean absolute error = 0.13421742 
 Squared correlation between observed and expected values=. 99906 
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All the variables used in the Tobit model to explain competition have turned out to be 
statistically significant
18
. To start with, it is seen that the predicted values of the 
concentration ratio exerts a   significant negative impact on competition. This is in 
line with hypothesis, which already exists in the literature.  The variables relating to 
other fixed asset and standard deviation in wages, as a ratio of operational expenditure 
has emerged as negative and significant in explaining competition. While other fixed 
asset is used as a proxy of technology, which in turn is an aspect of basic conditions, 
other variable captures   a strategic conduct of the new and old banks. Both groups of 
banks seek to compete with each other, with their strategic stance with respect to the 
variable. While old banks want to cope up with the new banks with a higher ratio of 
wages to operational expenditure, new banks sought to contain the ratio and entered 
the market with a significantly lower ratio of wages to operational expenditure and the 
standard deviation of the ratio increased in the industry over the period of time as a 
result of entry.  Thus, by means of strategic conduct with regard to wage component 
of operational expenditure, old banks sought to prevent the new banks from 
improving their ranks by means of their strategic conduct, while, the new banks 
sought to dislodge the old banks from their current status. In their attempts to contain 
each other, they have put pressure on each other, which resulted in a situation, in 
which a reduction in change of the ranks of banks has come about. This has led to a 
negative impact on competition. A similar explanation may be provided to explain the 
negative and significant impact of the variable related to   technology on competition. 
By going for new technology, both groups of the banks have tried to contain each 
other, which has led to reduced changes in ranks of banks, resulting in lower rivalry 
                                                 
18
 The two variables standard deviation of the ratio of wages to operational expenditure and predicted 
values of the ratio of profit to assets are correlated. The coefficient of correlation is significant at 5%. 
However, two auxiliary equations were run, and the results show that the multicollinearity is not 
severe. 
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and hence lower competition. The next variable, in order, is profitability. It is seen to 
exert a positive and significant impact on competition. In the standard textbook 
discussion, entry takes place in an industry to compete away supernormal profits in an 
industry. Profitability, entry and competition are all linked to one another.  
The new banks bought efficient units, with each one to share a larger pie in the 
total profits. The search for profit by the new banks in a deregulated regime has led to 
increased churning of banks, resulting in both increased profits and more intense 
rivalry. Lastly, the dummy, which captures merger activity in the industry, has turned 
out to have positive and significant impact on competition. It may be attributed to the 
fact that merger is a strategic variable through which some banks seek to improve 
their ranks in order to cope up with their rivals in a competitive scenario.  The result 
demonstrates that variables related to basic conditions, structure, and conduct and 
performance influence competition. This provides support to the idea that competition 
is an all-pervasive phenomenon, which embraces all the aspects of the S-C-P 
paradigm.  
 In the literature, there exist attempts to define oligopoly in terms of 
concentration ratio alone. Attempts have been made to distinguish between different 
types of oligopoly (e.g. tight and loose) on the basis of concentration ratio. However, 
such attempts have the following problems. 
• There exists a contradiction among such studies.  
• The benchmarks used are not developed rigorously. 
 We wish to emphasize that the very approach of defining market form in terms 
of concentration ratio is not satisfactory. Our understanding is that market form is an 
overall concept. All the elements of structure, conduct and performance are to be 
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analyzed to define a market form. Traditional S-C-P defines a market form in terms of 
price cost margin. A major thrust of the paper is that an analysis of market form is 
neither based on price cost margin nor is it based on a single criterion like 
concentration. 
 Market from transcends structure, conduct and performance. Different 
characteristics of structure, conduct and performance, as emerged from the study need 
to put together, to examine whether they are providing a consistent picture of market 
form. We are pursuing the argument about market form through all the aspects of S-
C-P approach, so that we can arrive at an integrated view of market form, which is not 
ambiguous or partial. 
 It is apparent that concentration cannot provide any clue to existence of 
oligopoly in private banking industry. Let us look at product differentiation, another 
element of market structure, analyzed in the literature
19
. It shows that entry has 
exerted a positive impact on product differentiation. Product differentiation cannot   
exist in perfect competition.
20
.  
To reveal presence of firm effect, time effect and variable effect in the data an 
ANOVA analysis was conducted in the literature
21
. The results confirm the presence 
of firm effect. Firm effect, once again cannot be reconciled with perfect competition, 
where a firm is passive it merely adjusts to industry conditions and has no 
independent existence. Presence of strategic group demonstrated that firms belonging 
different strategic groups pursue different strategic behaviour in order to manipulate 
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 Deb, Ashis Taru (2005) Chapter IV.  
20
 Deb, Ashis Taru (2005) Chapter V. 
21
 Murthy and Deb(2006) 
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their market shares
22
. Demonstration of product differentiation, firm effect, and 
strategic group in the literature support our understanding that the private banking 
market cannot be characterized by perfect competition. 
 One makes some conjecture about degree of collusion at the top. There was 
some scope of an institutional framework, called consortium banking to promote 
collusion at the top. This apparently created a static scenario at the top reflected in 
unchanged identities of top five banks till 1996. However, such an institutional 
requirement was made optional in 1997. In the same year, identities of the few top 
banks changed and two new firms replaced two old firms. There is likelihood that the 
banks have discontinued the practice of consortium banking, when it was made 
optional in 1997. It is only when old banks discontinued the practice, new banks 
replaced two old banks and ultimately two new banks managed to enter the top two 
slots. Thus while there is some evidence of collusive behaviour and existence of an 
oligopolistic market structure during 1991-92 to 1995-96 in private banking, such a 
characterization is not true for the later period.  
 The above analysis in terms of structure and conduct rejects characterization 
of private banking market in terms of either monopolistic competition or oligopoly.  
Now, the aspect of performance needs to be analyzed, to examine if it provides any 
clue to existence of monopolistic competition in the said industry. Our attempt to infer 
market form using performance aspect of the S-C-P paradigm is based on a crucial 
assumption. The mean profit is taken to represent the normal profit. 
Oligopoly is top heavy.  A few supernormal profit-making firms dominant the 
industry.  A large proportion of firms would be concentrated in the upper end. In 
                                                 
22
 Lastly, the existence of strategic groups in private banking industry is also 
demonstrated in the same study. 
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perfect competition, all firms make normal profit. But in an empirical situation, all 
firms need not exactly make normal profit. In perfect competition, majority of firms 
are concentrated around the mean, with a few in the two extreme regions.  Thus a 
perfectly competitive industry would be to be dominated by firms making normal 
profit. As opposed to the above two situations, long run situation in monopolistic 
competition is characterised by a constant state of flux. There is entry into the 
industry along with exit. Entry of new firm is not deterred by exit. New entrants enter 
with an optimistic note that they will be able to succeed by adopting appropriate 
strategies. The implication of such a characteristics of long run situation in 
monopolistic competition manifests in coexistence of firms with supernormal profit, 
normal profit and losses. Thus in case of monopolistic competition, there will be a 
large number of firms at the lower end compared to perfect competition. Firms 
making normal profit do not dominate the industry like under perfect competition, nor 
do firms making supernormal profit dominate the industry like oligopoly. The 
following characterises distribution of profits in case of oligopoly, imperfect 
competition and perfect competition. 
• In oligopoly, a larger proportion of firms is concentrated in the top segment of 
the distribution.  
• In perfect competition, proportion firms at the mean of the distribution of 
profits overwhelmingly dominate the distribution, with an insignificant 
proportion of firms being at either extreme. 
• In case of monopolistic competition, the proportion of firms in the bottom and 
central part will exceed the proportion of firms at the top. 
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  Let us now analyse the data relating to profitability. The average of the profit 
to asset ratio (ROA) of the banks, existing over the period 1995-96 to 2001-02, is 
averaged. This average is taken to be the rate of normal profit. A frequency 
distribution of the ROA s is constructed. Table 6 reports the distribution.  
Table 6 Frequency Distribution of Average ROA:1994-95 to 2001-02 
       
       
 Class Frequency Cumulative     
 Interval of Banks Frequency    
   (in percentage)   
 0.3-0.4 4 14.81    
 0.4-0.5 1 18.51    
 0.5-0.6 2 25.92    
 0.6-0.7 4 40.74    
 0.7-0.8 4 55.55    
 0.8-0.9 1 62.96    
 0.9-1 2 70.37    
 1-1.1 3 81.48    
 1.1-1.2 0 81.48    
 1.2-1.3 1 85.18    
 1.3-1.4 0 85.18    
 1.4-1.5 3 96.29    
 1.5-1.6 2 100    
       
 
The following observations are made from distribution of banks across different 
categories of profit.  The proportion of banks lying within the top two classes is 
around 18%. Even if the top segment is extended to include two more classes, the 
proportion increases to a mere 22%, compared to 40% of firms in the lower segment, 
defined similarly in terms of four smallest profit classes. This shows that the 
distribution is not top heavy, ruling out oligopoly. The mean lies within the sixth class 
interval, 0.8 to 0.9. If two classes above and below the mean class are included in the 
central part of the distribution, it is seen that 52% of the firms belongs to the central 
part of the distribution of profit. This does not overwhelmingly dominate the 
distribution, as would have been the case with perfect competition. If the central part 
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of the distribution is extended to include the class above the mean class, then the 
proportion of banks in the bottom and the central part stands around 67%, which is 
much above 33% covered by the top segment. This provides a picture of monopolistic 
competition. 
XI.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Commercial banking represents the ideal sector that combines the interest of 
both fiscal and monetary policy. Fiscal policy essentially is about financing growth 
and development. Banks too provide finance for growth. While a State-led strategy 
relies on fiscal development finance a market-led one would rely on banks. The study 
suggests that sources that finance growth should be competitive. While there does not 
exist much possibility of competition among institutions providing finance for public 
investment, competition can occur among banks, which are conduit of monetary 
policy. The study has sought to provide a conceptual and theoretical framework to 
measure and model competition in private banking industry in India. It used the 
concept of competition proposed by Stigler (1961) and measured it by Bodenhorn’s 
(1990) measure of competition in terms of degree of mobility. The study provides a 
critique of the mechanism of inducing competition, which is implicit in the 
Narasimham Committee (1991). It then provides the theoretical background of an 
alternative mechanism based on Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm, which 
apart from including traditional elements of S-C-P paradigm including entry, 
economies of scale, product differentiation and price cost margin, also incorporates 
basic conditions and strategic groups to analyse the process of market dynamics in the 
industry. The paper goes on to argue that competition goes beyond “conduct” and 
encompasses all the four components of S-C-P paradigm: basic conditions, structure, 
conduct and performance. Accordingly, a three equation simultaneous equation model 
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is developed to ultimately estimate the equation of competition through Tobit 
technique. The result demonstrates that variables related to basic conditions, structure, 
and conduct and performance influence competition. The study has found evidence 
against the simplistic relationship between concentration and competition, which 
remained implicit in the literature. 
The following hypotheses were tested.  
• Entry is not only factor influencing competition – This is proven by the 
fact that entry is only one of the factors in a three equation system. 
• Entry has an indirect impact on competition - This is proven by the logic 
that entry affects concentration, which then affects competition. 
• Strategic conduct plays a role in competition - This is clear from the 
results that show that two strategic conduct variables affect competition. 
• Competition can be measured and has specific determinants (Counter wise 
to Demstez, 1995) - We have shown show competition can be measured 
and that there are specific determinants through the system of equations. 
• The result demonstrates that variables related to basic conditions, 
structure, and conduct and performance influence competition. This 
provides support to the idea that competition is an all-pervasive 
phenomenon, which embraces all the aspects of the S-C-P paradigm.  
Finally, the adjunct empirical analysis of the dynamics of market shares, ranks, 
conduct variables and return reveals that the market form is close to monopolistic 
competition rather than oligopoly. 
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